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Regulatory Objectivity in Action: Mild Cognitive Impairment and the Collective 
Production of Uncertainty 
Tiago Moreira, Carl May, and John Bond 
 
Abstract 
In this paper, we investigate recent changes in the definition and approach to 
Alzheimer‘s disease brought about by growing clinical, therapeutic and regulatory 
interest in the prodromal or preclinical aspects of this condition. We explore how 
clinical and research actors, in collaboration with regulatory institutions and 
pharmaceutical companies, come to frame these domains as uncertainties and how 
they re-deploy uncertainty in the 'collective production' of new 
diagnostic conventions and bioclinical standards. While drawing as a 
background on ethnographic, documentary and interview data, the 
paper proposes an in-depth, contextual analysis of the proceedings 
of an international meeting organised by the Peripheral and Central 
Nervous System Drug Advisory Committee of the US Food and Drug 
Administration to discuss whether or not a particular diagnostic 
convention - Mild Cognitive Impairment or MCI - exists and how 
best it ought to be studied. Based on this analysis we argue that 
the deployment of uncertainty is reflexively implicated in bioclinical 
collectives' search for rules and conventions, and furthermore that 
the collective production of uncertainty is central to the 'knowledge 
machinery' of regulatory objectivity. 
 
Keywords: Alzheimer’s Disease; biomedicine; diagnostic convention; mild 
cognitive impairment; uncertainty. 
 
 
In the last decade, there has been increased interest in the biomolecular and 
epidemiological characterization of pre-clinical dementia. It is argued that early 
diagnosis of dementia and particularly of Alzheimer‘s Disease (AD) will facilitate the 
prevention of dementing processes and lower the prevalence of the condition in the 
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general population. The search for a diagnostic category or biomarker that would 
serve this purpose is an ongoing endeavour for research and clinical communities. 
This research, however, has been problematic, leading some commentators to argue 
that the categories and standards that support the work of clinicians and researchers 
‗reveal increasing ambiguity rather than clarity‘ (Gaines & Whitehouse, 2006: 62), in 
that boundaries are becoming less certain than before between normal aging and 
dementia, on the one hand, and different types of dementia -- Vascular dementia, 
Lewy-Body dementia or Fronto-temporal dementia-- on the other.  
In this paper, we investigate how clinicians and researchers, in collaboration 
with regulatory institutions and pharmaceutical companies, come to frame these 
uncertainties and re-deploy them in the ‗collective production‘ of new diagnostic 
conventions and bioclinical standards. Our point of departure is that such practices are 
concerned with a distinctive type of objectivity, regulatory objectivity, that focuses on 
the establishment of conventions through collectively concerted programs of action 
(Cambrosio et al. 2006). This form of objectivity is particularly suited to the complex, 
non-linear relationships established between laboratory biology and the clinic in 
contemporary medicine, in which hybrid bio-clinical entities are set up to mediate the 
relationship between those settings (Keating & Cambrosio, 2003).  In this context, the 
establishment of conventional standard and systems of regulation are viewed as  
endogenous requirements for ongoing knowledge production, innovation and clinical 
work rather than forms of external control. Here, we offer a detailed view of the 
collective, reflexive work that is entailed in making such conventions.  
The paper focuses on one such conventional standard: Mild Cognitive 
Impairment (MCI).  MCI is a concept originally coined by the American neurologist 
Ronald Petersen to describe a transitional stage between normal cognitive aging and 
dementia (Petersen et al. 1999; Petersen, 2003). Our interest in it is that it was also 
explicitly devised as an attempt to bridge  emerging biomolecular models of 
Alzheimer‘s disease progression with secondary prevention therapies being devised in 
laboratories at the turn of the 21
st
 century and the perceived increase in the 
presentation of ‗mild memory problems‘ in the clinic around the same period 
(Petersen et al, 2001). According to this view, MCI was to bring together the 
laboratory and the clinic into one common ground of understanding Alzheimer‘s 
disease. That this view was not generally and immediately accepted in the field of 
dementia research, practice and policy provide us with the opportunity to analyse an 
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aspect of regulatory objectivity that has remained hitherto unexplored: how are 
conventional standards put together. In the paper, we explore the processes through 
which conventional standards are proposed, criticised, evaluated and re-configured to 
serve the purpose of a diverse and changing configurations of actors and settings. 
While drawing on ethnographic, documentary and interview data documenting the 
scientific, clinical and political controversy around MCI,
i
 the paper analyses one 
single turning point in this process: the proceedings of an international meeting about 
MCI organised by the Peripheral and Central Nervous System Drug Advisory 
Committee of the US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) in 2001 (Food and Drug 
Administration, 2001). The policies and agenda laid at this meeting came to shape 
most of the subsequent basic, clinical and therapeutic research in this area as well as 
the clinical guidelines and consensus groups held on MCI to this day (Petersen et al. 
2001; Winblad et al. 2004; Gauthier et al. 2006). Furthermore, in this meeting, for the 
first time in its history, the FDA asked one of its committees ‗to address some 
fundamental aspects of a particular diagnosis …, and decide if it exists and how best it 
ought to be studied‘ (Food and Drug Administration 2001), rather than considering a 
licensing application for a specific drug. As such, this meeting constitutes an 
important resource not only to understand the history of MCI as a conventional 
bioclinical entity, but more importantly to examine regulatory objectivity in action. 
The main finding of this analysis is that actors‘ assessments of ‗evidence‘ and 
reflexive engagement with conventional aspects of their practice, which Cambrosio 
and colleagues consider central to regulatory objectivity, are both embedded in an 
ongoing ‗collective production of uncertainty‘. We argue that uncertainty should be 
understood not merely as the ‗context of‘ bioclinical collectives‘ search for rules and 
conventions but also as an achievement endogenous to -- and essential for -- the 
dynamics of those collectives (Bourret & Rabeharisoa, 2008).
ii
 From this perspective, 
uncertainty is not a socio-cognitive ambivalence experienced by individuals in 
complex decision-making situations (Fox, 1959; Fox, 2000) Our empirical focus is on 
the practical accomplishment of uncertainty, on two levels. First, we are interested in 
uncertainty as a way of framing the organisation of knowledge production, 
technological development and policy formulation in domains characterised by 
controversy and indeterminacy (Callon, 1998). In the first section of this paper, we 
describe how epistemic, technological and political changes in the field of AD worked 
together to unsettle the relations between laboratories, clinics, and regulatory and 
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policy institutions established at the end of the 1970‘s. We will then suggest that the 
emergence of prodromal dementia categories, such as MCI, can be seen as attempts to 
wane the proliferation of uncertainties in this domain
iii
, and that, in this respect, the 
FDA 2001 MCI meeting represents a key collective effort to frame this process. This 
last point relates to our second understanding of uncertainty as a discursive, 
interactive accomplishment. Here, we draw from Lynch‘s (1998) homology between 
the lines of interrogation of evidence deployed by lawyers in the OJ Simpson 1994-95 
trial and the modes of enquiry employed by academic STS. His analysis of lawyers‘ 
‗deconstructive‘ investigations of forensic DNA profiling as a sociology of 
knowledge machine provides an insight into the power of settings such as courts in 
transforming ands unsettling stable socio-technical arrangements. But while Lynch‘s 
investigation was anchored on STS‘ conceptual opposition between stability and 
uncertainty, our focus was on how participants in the FDA meeting collaboratively 
exposed the uncertainties and the historical contingencies of the conventions that 
support their activities at one particular time in order to construct another explicitly 
contingent category. In the main section of the paper, we examine how this was 
achieved by a) predicating the exploration of uncertainties about MCI upon the 
definition of the political boundaries for the collective, b) redistributing uncertainty to 
adjacent domains, and c) drawing from this extended uncertainty to formulate a policy 
of articulation between research and clinical practice based on the transience of MCI 
as a category. Through these procedures, actors invested an uncertain and transient 
conventional category with the power to mediate and organise the exploration of 
indeterminacies and ambiguities about dementia and its treatment. We suggest that the 
collective production of uncertainty should be seen not as the reverse but as 
constituent to the temporary stabilisation of biomedicine‘s knowledge and entities in 
the clinic, laboratory and regulatory fora. In these types of setting, STS‘ lines of 
enquiry might be more useful than they have been in the courts (Lynch and Cole, 
2005)   
 
Bioclinical Uncertainty in Alzheimer’s Disease and Related Dementias 
In the historiography of Alzheimer‘s disease (Ballenger, 2006), it is generally 
accepted that the re-awakening of interest in senile dementia in the 1960‘s was 
sparked by the publication of studies led by Martin Roth and colleagues at Newcastle 
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(UK), which correlated the number of neuritic plaques in patients‘ brains with the 
scores obtained by those patients in cognitive tests  (Roth et al. 1966). Developments 
in electron microscopy in the early 1960‘s had fostered a re-description of the 
neuropathological features of dementia at the ultra-structural level (Kidd, 1963; Terry, 
1963) and this created interest in neurobiology among neuropathologists. This interest 
reshaped Alzheimer‘s disease during the 1970‘s, and was the basis for a number of 
etiological theories that were proposed in that decade, the most important of which 
addressed the possibility of a scrapie-like virus, toxic effects of aluminium in the 
brain and a deficit of the neurotransmitter acetylcholine. This last hypothesis, 
supported by neurochemistry studies that linked the cholinergic system in the brain 
and the cognitive deficits observed in patients suspected to have Alzheimer‘s disease, 
became the focus of a considerable proportion of the Alzheimer‘s disease research in 
the late 1970‘s and early 1980‘s (Davies & Maloney, 1976; Perry et al. 1977; 
Whitehouse et al. 1982).  
These advances in the understanding of the biology of the disease were 
accompanied by an intensive process of characterization of the disease processes from 
a clinical/behavioural perspective. Already in synchrony with the Newcastle 
correlation studies, Blessed, Tomlinson and Roth had developed an informant-based 
instrument to assess memory, concentration and orientation (Ballenger, 2006). This 
was followed by a series of tools aiming to measure mental status, such as the Mini 
Mental Status Exam (Folstein et al. 1975), tests concerned with ‗clinically observable 
deterioration‘ such as Global Deterioration Scale (GDS) (Flicker et al., 1991), and 
others aimed at assessing behavioural changes, or cognitive performance. The 
multiplication of instruments, the establishment of the Alzheimer‘s Disease Research 
Centres in the US and, in part energized by these new centres, the perceived increase 
in demand for dementia care, created the context for a consensus conference that set 
criteria for the clinical diagnosis of AD (McKhann et al. 1984). The establishment of 
this ‗conventional standard‘ supported clinical diagnoses of AD, which themselves 
embodied a vision of the integration between research, therapeutic experimentation 
and clinical practice (Moreira, in press).             
This envisioned coherence was, however, not solely the product of a 
spontaneous self-organising process between research and clinical constituencies. In a 
crucial way, this coherence had been framed and shaped by the efforts of the National 
Institute of Aging (NIA), particularly after the nomination of Zaven Khachaturian as 
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Director of the Neuroscience and Neuropsychology of Aging Program in 1977, which 
enveloped these constituencies, political actors and the ‗American public‘ within what 
Robert Butler, the founding director of the NIA, called the ‗health politics of anguish‘ 
(Fox 1989). The ‗politics of anguish‘ and the activities of the Alzheimer‘s Association 
were key in the NIA‘s efforts to obtain budget increases from the US Congress, as 
well as its efforts to crystallize a new political understanding of old age and its 
changing dynamics (Holstein, 2000). In this context, it was possible for this 
bioclinical collective to establish itself in the public arena, with further the assistance 
of expert calculations of the dimension of the ‗problem of dementia‘ in the US 
(Katzman, 1976).  
The alignment between the worlds of research, clinical practice, politics and 
patient advocacy that underpinned the emergence of the bioclinical collective for AD 
was, however, built upon shifting foundations. The same molecular techniques that 
had first energised AD research in the 1970‘s were already, during the 1980‘s, 
suggesting possible alternatives to the ‗cholinergic hypothesis‘; alternatives that were 
linked to the therapeutic implications of the solubility of amyloid in the neuritic 
plaques found in brains of patient with Alzheimer‘s disease (Glenner & Wong, 1984). 
Also it was becoming clear that expectations, fostered during 1970s and 80s, for a 
‗rational‘, unproblematic translation of the cholinergic hypothesis into safe 
pharmacology were unrealistic. When results of clinical trials of cholinesterase 
inhibitors (ChEIs) started surfacing in the 1990s, the expectations in the clinical 
research community had been already significantly lowered (Moreira, in Press). 
Drawing on a genetic model of the pathogenesis of early-onset AD, the bioclinical 
collective of AD appeared, during the 1990s, to focus its attention and therapeutic 
hopes on what became known as the ‗amyloid cascade hypothesis‘ (Hardy and 
Higgins, 1992). Despite its success, controversy about the validity of the theory 
increased over the years, as competing theories were proposed that emphasized the 
role of the tau protein in the formation of axonal ‗tangles‘ (Lovestone & Reynolds, 
1997), upstream oxidative stress (Nunomura et al. 2006), or the dynamics of protein 
folding.  
This multiplication of hypotheses was further compounded by the evolving 
relationship between different types of dementia. While the definition of AD proposed 
the during the 1970s relied on its differentiation from the vascular models of dementia 
that had been popular before (Ballenger, 2006), during the 1990‘s new work 
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demonstrated that vascular pathologies, notably atherosclerosis, white matter lesions, 
and mid-life arterial hypertension, were associated with AD and could enhance 
cognitive loss (Humpel & Marksteiner, 2005). Furthermore, research on the biology 
of dementia with Lewy bodies, Parkinson disease dementia, and fronto-temporal 
dementia led to a redefinition of the classification of the dementias. In this 
classification, AD shared characteristics with both amyloidopathies, such as Familial 
Amyloid Polineuropathy (Corino de Andrade‘s Disease), and taupathies, such as 
fronto-temporal dementia, or progressive supranuclear palsy. These trends, it was 
increasingly realised, could potentially lead to the disaggregation of the ‗identity‘ of 
the AD and its bioclinical collective. 
Those concerned with the clinical diagnosis and management of AD had to 
deal with different problems. While the establishment of the ‗conventional standard‘ 
for the diagnosis of AD (McKhann et al., 1984) and the arrival of ChEIs helped to 
consolidate and stabilize the category of AD itself, the striving towards reliability and 
consistency across AD clinics may have produced a paradoxical effect. From the 
beginning, clinical assessment tools such as the GDS had included milder-than-
dementia levels of cognitive impairment and seemed to suggest a continuous path in 
this condition. In fact, a debate about whether AD is qualitatively different from 
normal aging or quantitatively different along a cognitive continuum had been alive 
since the 1980‘s (Brayne & Calloway, 1988; Anonymous, 1989). The introduction of 
standardized criteria for the diagnosis of AD in 1984, however, excluded persons 
presenting with ‗mild memory problems‘. Thus, in the next ten years there was a 
multiplication of terms to categorise the ‗forgetfulness‘ experienced by a growing 
number of patients perhaps affected by increased public awareness of the cognitive 
symptoms of AD: Age Associated Memory Impairment (Crook & Larrabee, 1988); 
Mild Cognitive Impairment (Flicker et al. 1991), Age Related Cognitive Decline; Age 
Associated Cognitive Decline and Cognitive Impairment, No Dementia.  
Another consequence of the establishment of standardised diagnostic criteria 
for AD was the emergence of fractures within the space of representation for 
dementia. As a variety of professions became involved in the care of AD patients, 
different accounts of the reality of AD and the needs of patients started surfacing.  
One of most significant of these fractures resulted in the emergence of a coherent 
psychosocial model of dementia in the late 1980‘s developed by Tom Kitwood and 
others (Kitwood 1993). This psychosocial model criticized the biomedical model of 
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dementia (Bond, 1992), and generated a concern for patients as a ‗persons‘. It 
changed the focus of research and drew attention to patients‘ personal needs, and has 
underpinned much of the criticism about the imbalance of attention and investment 
between the two main axes of the dementia health policy: the ‗search for a cure‘ and 
the organisation of ‗care‘.    
 
Mild Cognitive Impairment and ‘the FDA Meeting’ 
In the past decade or so, the AD bioclinical collective appears to have experienced 
fundamental uncertainty at all levels, from the understanding of the basic 
pathogenesis of the condition, to clinical practice and health policy. These 
uncertainties cannot be understood in absolute terms, but only in relation to the 
coordination achieved in the field during the 1980‘s, on the one hand, and the 
emergent agreement within the collective that only preventative strategies could 
tackle the progression and lower the prevalence of AD, on the other. Despite their 
multiplicity, most of the hypotheses circulated in the field have attempted to identify 
the ‗first event‘ in the pathological process leading to clinical dementia, and have 
suggested therapeutic approaches to halt the progression. This perspective encouraged 
increased interest in identifying pre-clinical stages of dementia (Lock, 2006). In this 
process, prodromal dementia categories were positioned as possible re-articulations 
between different types of laboratories – molecular biology, neuropathology, 
neuropsychology, neuroimaging, etc. -- and the clinic, in an attempt to ‗cool down‘ or 
stabilise some of the uncertainties discussed in the last section. 
One of the most successful re-articulations was the concept of Mild Cognitive 
Impairment. Originally conceived as a specific stage on the GDS scale (Flicker, Ferris 
et al. 1991), it was only in the end of the 1990‘s that, by the hand of Ronald Petersen 
and colleagues at the Mayo Clinic, Rochester, it came to be embody such potential for 
intermediation between the laboratory and the clinic  (Petersen, Smith et al. 1999). 
This is well exemplified in the justification given for the concept of MCI in an 
important review of the concept  
Basic research, such as the identification of secretase inhibitors and the 
development of an immunization model for the prevention of amyloid 
deposition, underscores the importance of developing techniques for early 
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detection (of AD). Parallel with these endeavours, clinical research aimed at 
identifying the earliest signs of cognitive impairment has progressed. … 
Mild cognitive impairment deserves recognition and further study because, as 
preventive treatments for AD become available, it will become incumbent on 
clinicians to identify persons at risk of AD and those with the earliest signs of 
clinical impairment. (Petersen et al. 2001) 
   
In its original formulation, MCI defined a transitional stage between normal cognitive 
aging and dementia. As a syndrome it consists of the clinical presentation of a 
memory complaint, accompanied by an objective memory impairment (assessed by 
clinical interviews, psychological and brain imaging tests), but absence of any other 
cognitive impairment, and essentially preserved activities of daily living. MCI also 
excludes the diagnosis of dementia (Petersen et al. 1999). Based on longitudinal 
controlled studies of clinical populations, MCI identifies individuals ‗at risk of 
dementia‘. The aim  of MCI, at this point in time, was mainly to identify a population 
for research on the bioclinical antecedents of dementia and, as the quote suggests, to 
test the effectiveness of preventative therapies for AD.  
This definition had considerable success in attracting the interest of the AD research 
community (see Figure 1): from 1999 to 2004 the number of publications on MCI 
increased six fold, in fields ranging from clinical genetics, to epidemiology, 
neuropsychology, and neuroimaging. Pharmaceutical companies, many of which 
funded a significant proportion of the research on MCI, were interested in the 
possibility that the new category would enable researchers to target a population 
suitable for a new generation of drugs.      
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Fig 1: Source (Petersen 2005) Reproduced by kind permission of the 
author.  
As was suggested in the last section, the shifting understanding of the 
pathogenesis of AD, combined with the ‗modest‘ clinical effects of ChEIs, led to a re-
orientation of basic and therapeutic research. It was thus possible to observe that, 
during the 1990‘s this bioclinical collective moved towards a new therapeutic 
vocabulary that emphasized the ability for molecular compounds to be ‗disease 
modifying‘ (Moreira, in Press). Research groups became increasingly interested in 
finding pharmacological agents that would target the molecular mechanisms that 
precede neuronal death (amyloid aggregation, etc). This trend also encapsulated the 
idea that these agents would only be effective when used before such pathological 
molecular processes manifested themselves clinically. It is widely recognised that it is 
very difficult to evaluate such therapies, both because they are more likely to off-set 
the risk-benefit ratio acceptable for non-symptomatic individuals involved in clinical 
trials, and because they require larger, longer and more expensive types of trial design 
(see, for example, Citron, 2004).  
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From this perspective, MCI presented itself as a possible ‗bridge‘ between 
previous designs used in this field and new trial designs. If it would be possible to 
find, through this transitory design, whether a drug could be meaningfully evaluated, 
the next steps towards funding longer, larger trials could then be taken. If this scenario 
seemed probable, and even desirable for pharmaceutical companies, their researchers 
and their academic collaborators, they had only one problem. MCI was not at that 
time (circa 2000) recognised as a clinical entity by any of the international or 
professional disease classifying institutions.
iv
 There was thus uncertainty about 
whether the results of ongoing trials would have any meaning for drug approval 
institutions such as the FDA.  
MCI also presented new opportunities for ChEIs marketing licence holders. 
Because there was an accepted view that ChEIs had moderate effects on cognitive 
abilities and clinical symptoms of dementia, it was possible to argue that such effects 
would be more significant in milder stages of the disease. This obviously would also 
represent an extension of the market for ChEIs. In addition, in previous years there 
had been controversy about whether the outcomes chosen by the FDA to evaluate 
anti-dementia drugs – change in cognitive scores plus one global measure of 
functioning (Leber, 1990) – were the most appropriate given that, as one coalition of 
researchers put it, ‗[t]he maintenance of baseline levels in … Alzheimer‘s disease 
may be a more relevant goal to … individual patients than transient cognitive 
improvement‘ (Winblad et al. 2001: 656). From this perspective, MCI could become 
an important tool to trace the evolution of these baseline scores in a population at 
‗risk‘. The recognition of MCI patients as a ‗target population‘ by the FDA, in fact, 
would be an important step in changing the evaluation framework that was (and still 
is) seen to constrain the evaluative performance of ChEIs.  
MCI brought together the interests of a multiple array of actors and 
constituencies who identified the FDA as a crucial mediator in this process. This was 
materialised in a number of requests to the FDA by companies asking to develop 
treatments for MCI (Food and Drug Administration, 2001: 10). This created a 
particular problem for the FDA because its approval of any specific product is linked, 
through the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, to how the product is presented in 
its ‗product label‘ and, as Dr. Katz, representing the FDA, said in his opening address 
to the meeting, to ‗whether or not the population for whom the drug is intended can be 
unambiguously described‘ (Food and Drug Administration, 2001: 11).  The FDA thus 
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had to take the unusual step of assessing the validity, reliability and sensitivity of a 
bioclinical construct, and of evaluating whether the existing ambiguities of the 
concept were likely to disappear or increase.  
In order to take that step, the FDA‘s Peripheral and Central Nervous System 
Drugs Advisory Committee organised a meeting to which it invited a panel of FDA 
experts, public speakers and an audience. ‗The FDA meeting‘, as it subsequently 
came to be known by researchers and practitioners in the field, was held on 13
th
 of 
March 2001, and included presentations by eight experts, who were selected by the 
FDA on the basis of contributions to research on MCI. They were: Dr. Petersen, the 
neurologist who proposed the term in its current use; Dr. Dekoski, neurologist and 
advocate of the clinical application of a PET scan approach to dementia biomarking 
(Lopresti et al. 2005); Dr. Duara, a neurologist known for his view that MCI is a 
general syndrome associated with various pathologies (Loewenstein et al. 2006);  Dr. 
Reisberg, a geriatric psychiatrist particularly concerned with the clinical significance 
of subjective memory impairment (Flicker et al. 1991); Dr. Ganguli, general 
psychiatrist and epidemiologist of dementia, a ‗friendly sceptic‘ towards the concept 
(Ganguli et al. 2004); Dr. Ferris, a psychologist, collaborator of Dr. Reisberg; Dr. 
Shah, psychologist and proponent of the cognitive testing approach to dementia 
screening; and one representative of an European drug development team, Dr. 
Waegemans. In addition, various (mainly expert) participants in the audience were 
allowed to ask questions to the panel.  
The panel and speakers were asked to answer and discuss the following 
questions:  a) Can MCI be clearly defined in a clinical setting? b) Are there valid 
criteria for the diagnosis of MCI? c) Can MCI be distinguished from Alzheimer‘s 
Disease and other causes of dementia? d) What outcome measures are appropriate to 
use in clinical drug trails conducted in MCI? and e) Should clinical drug trials in MCI 
incorporate any special features in their design? Although biomolecular and other 
basic researchers were not present at the meeting, the discussions were framed by the 
need to articulate new biomolecular models of AD with clinical practice, including 
the possibility of using biological ‗surrogate markers‘ such as brain imaging or CSF 
analysis as measures in clinical trials.              
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The Collective Production of Uncertainty 
The FDA meeting‘s agenda was aligned with the emerging epistemic and biomedical 
expectations of the collective that were referred to in the beginning of the last section. 
In setting the meeting, its organisers were required to ‗translate‘ these expectations 
and processes into a confined space (Callon, 1986). This transposition entailed the 
coordination of persons, spaces and materials that together could ‗make present‘ the 
complex interrelations of a bioclinical collective. In this ‗the FDA meeting‘ shared a 
number of characteristics with clinical practice guideline development meetings, in 
particular the focus on the interaction between the discussion within the meeting and 
the ‗outside world‘, both as context of production of the issues discussed in the 
meeting, and as context of reception of the documents and policies assembled at the 
meeting (Moreira, 2005).  It thus became acutely important to establish temporal and 
symbolic linkages between those contexts. Analysis of the transcript of the FDA 
meeting suggests that this was achieved in three steps, albeit not sequentially. The 
boundary between the context of the meeting and the meeting itself was built through 
the (mainly discursive) enactment of a link between the uncertainties surrounding the 
category of MCI and the group of experts assembled at the meeting. How the 
participants maintained this link throughout the meeting is the focus of the first 
subsection below. If the participants had not attempted to extend uncertainty to other, 
hitherto unopened black boxes, this might have threatened the correlated solidarity of 
the confined collective assembled at the meeting. This redistribution of uncertainty is 
the focus of the second subsection. The third subsection explores how participants 
drew from this extended uncertainty to articulate a policy to link research and clinical 
practice, based on the transience of MCI as a category. This policy could be the 
reason why the FDA meeting became a turning point in the history of MCI and the 
AD bioclinical collective.   
Putting a Fence Around a Mystery 
The main challenge the FDA faced in preparing this meeting was to balance the 
representation of the various perspectives about MCI proposed in the field with the 
need to achieve an accountable outcome within the given time constraints. The choice 
of speakers thus followed a policy that Dr. Katz summarised in his opening remarks 
to the meeting,  
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MCI, as you know has been characterised variously in the literature but, 
in general, it is a condition that is described as occurring in elderly 
patients who predominantly have a memory impairment … and patients 
are considered neither to be normal nor to have dementia but their 
cognitive status falls somewhere in between. (Food and Drug 
Administration, 2001: 10, our emphasis) 
Dr. Katz reduces the range in perspectives on MCI, including those that questioned 
the utility of trying to describe it in the first place, by accepting that ‗in general, it is a 
condition’. This re-description of the epistemic status of MCI in ‗the literature‘ allows 
him to bring together the participants in the meeting because it makes visible the 
difference between ‗out there‘ and ‗in here‘ by confining the level of uncertainty that 
the meeting will take into account. The micropolitical significance of this policy is 
important to note: it enables the collective exploration of the uncertainty and 
controversy about MCI at the meeting to be guarded against outright challenge or 
deconstruction.  Having established this, Dr. Katz then goes on to say that, 
In the case of MCI there is not unanimity in the literature about the 
diagnostic criteria that can reliably identify patients who are alleged to 
have the condition. So, as I say, one of the critical questions we would 
like you to address is whether or not you believe that there does exist a 
set of criteria that can be readily applied by practitioners and that can 
reproducibly and reliably identify patients presumed to have MCI. (p. 
11) 
The shift in the epistemic status of MCI from ‗a condition‘ to an ‗alleged‘ reality or 
‗presumed‘ diagnosis is striking. But Dr. Katz does more than just deepen the doubt 
that he and the FDA are prepared to cast upon MCI, he also sets up the basic rules of 
the ‗sociology of knowledge machine‘ of the meeting (Lynch, 1998). The selected 
presenters are asked to give their views of whether or not they ‗believe that there does 
exist a set of criteria‘ to identify MCI against a sceptical panel. This format is familiar 
to the FDA members, who apply it to assess and deconstruct claims made by 
pharmaceutical companies about drugs. In the context of this ‗unusual‘ meeting, 
however, the questioning could not be solely focused on the strength of the claims 
presented to the Committee, as the links that support the reliability of MCI were in 
question from the very beginning. In effect, it appears that the FDA‘s usual machinery 
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was put in the service of exploring the possible and expected articulations between 
research and practice that different versions of MCI might offer. This is observable, 
for example, in the Q&A that followed Dr. Petersen‘s presentation. 
DR. KAWAS: Actually, I would like to ask a question of Dr. Petersen, 
and it has to do primarily with the issue of defining this entity out in the 
clinical setting. … [I]n the clinical setting what instruments would you 
recommend that the clinician be using to identify these individuals? 
Would it be the four that you showed us and the ones that we use in the 
research environment, or what are your thoughts on that? 
DR. PETERSEN: That actually is a very important issue and a difficult 
one because while I think it is a readily identifiable condition, that is, 
there are a fair number of people who fall into this, I am not necessarily 
convinced that it can be identified in a quick and dirty fashion. [In a 
clinical trial] we are using the Mini-Mental State performance above 24. 
… Then, we are using a memory tool, paragraph recall …. Again, that is 
not the end-all, be-all but I think it takes something like that. I don't 
think it can be done quickly in the office setting. (p. 46) 
Dr. Kawas‘ question deals with the possibility of extending the detection of MCI in 
contexts other than the research settings where it was originally formulated. As Dr. 
Petersen‘s reply makes clear, Dr. Kawas is interested in knowing what forms of work 
support this diagnostic convention. In Dr. Petersen‘s opinion, the diagnostic work that 
produces MCI cannot be easily extended to ‗the office setting‘ in primary or non-
specialist care. This might explain the difference between what he estimates to be the 
‗number of people who fall into this‘ category and those who were actually identified 
at the time of the meeting. By suggesting that MCI requires a specialist setting to be 
identified, Dr. Petersen is also advocating a way to address the uncertainty that had 
lingered and still lingers over MCI: managing and perhaps reducing this uncertainty in 
the ‗expert‘ setting of AD centres.  
The transportability of MCI thus became one of the central points of debate 
within the meeting, not only because it focuses on the uncertainty about whether or 
not MCI ‗really exists‘, but also because it offers different answers to the questions 
posed by the FDA about clinical trial design. This link was explicitly made in a 
question to Dr. Ferris by Dr. Wolinski, one the member of the FDA committee: 
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DR. WOLINSKY: I guess one of the things that I am struggling with is  
… if you could actually construct a trial and were lucky enough to have 
a pharmacologic agent, carried out in careful clinical settings, that 
actually delayed the progression from phase I to phase II, or whatever 
we call this, and the person on the street can only diagnose phase II and 
we don't know whether starting the drug at phase II will prevent 
progression to phase III, what do we then do when we have a drug for 
which no one can make a diagnosis except in very rigorous, well-
defined confines? (p. 98) 
A similar point is addressed by Dr. Ganguli later in her response to a question posed 
by Dr. Duara: 
DR. GANGULI: Well, I share your view about the [existence of a 
cognitive] continuum, and my understanding of why we are discussing 
this conversion is only to try and find out an appropriate endpoint for an 
MCI trial. My view as a clinician is that I can already treat somebody 
off-label if I think that he has incipient AD. I don't really need to have 
the FDA or DS to say that MCI is a non-indication. So, if the question is 
how do we better define this condition for its own sake so we 
understand the pathology, that is one thing. If you are saying how do we 
define it as an indication for drugs, that is a question I am not qualified 
to answer. (p. 131) 
In Dr. Ganguli‘s view of the link between these two issues is evidently problematic: 
by putting the two together, the FDA and, for that matter, the rest of the presenters, 
were defining MCI as a suitable stage to test and probably use new, preventative 
therapies for AD.  For her, the question of whether or not MCI is an entity ‗out in the 
trenches‘ precedes the formulation of a therapeutic or public health strategy. 
Following this exchange, various participants suggest possible estimations of 
prevalence of MCI in the general population, none of them actually supported by data, 
which leads Dr. Kawas to the conclusion that ‗what we need to do to find the estimate 
that people are looking for is to go back to the trenches‘ (p. 138).  
The FDA‘s ‗sociology of knowledge machine‘ appears to have worked here to 
reduce the conflict between the two versions of how to define the uncertainty of MCI. 
Furthermore, the co-existence and proposed synchronicity of a programme of 
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epidemiological research with a programme of therapeutic research also represents a 
different approach to the management of uncertainty proposed by Dr. Ganguli. While 
hers is a staged approach where the contours of the problem have to be defined before 
thinking how to tackle it, the FDA‘s proposal was one of maximising possible 
uncertainties.  Importantly, the FDA proposal also opened up the possibility of a 
future alignment between the epidemiology of MCI, its extended clinical use as 
diagnostic category, and the implementation of therapeutic strategies. 
One important aspect of this policy of opening a future where differences might 
coordinate is that it relied on cautious surveillance over the black boxing processes 
during the meeting. Near the end of the meeting, Dr Van Belle, a member of the 
committee, alludes to such black boxing with a reference to putting ‗a fence around 
the mystery‘: 
DR. VAN BELLE: I think we have defined a mystery. We have sort of 
put a fence around the mystery but we have really heard many ways of 
defining MCI today and I am not sure that there is a consistent 
operational entity that we can deal with at a relatively simple level. … I 
am not sure that it is very useful from a clinical point of view to try to 
do something like this at a national level. From a research level, an 
institution or a group could come to some agreement as to how they are 
going to define operationally such an entity and then do some research 
on that. But in terms of really having a clinical entity, I just haven't seen 
the evidence yet. (p. 205)  
Dr. Katz‘s view was not much different: 
At least by some definition as I understand the Petersen criteria, there 
really is no functional impairment. Other people have different 
definitions of MCI that do include functional impairment. So, you know, 
we are sort of back to ‗do we all know what we are talking about when 
we say MCI?‘. (p. 258) 
The significance of these interventions has to do with the interaction between 
what Dr. Belle called the ‗fence‘ and the ‗mystery‘. The discursive production of the 
mystery within the meeting was deployed through an exploration of the uncertainties 
surrounding MCI – whether it is one thing or a complex syndrome with 
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heterogeneous symptoms, whether it is early AD or an entity in itself, etc. The 
committee‘s dissatisfaction with the answers provided by the speakers enabled the 
participants to widen the collective that was concerned with this ‗entity‘s‘ probable 
existence: whereas at the beginning of the meeting, MCI was located within a few 
research clinics, the exploration of uncertainties in the relation between these sites and 
the ‗real world‘ (of everyday clinical practice) or epidemiological and biomolecular 
research provided a new, extended set of possible relations for MCI.   
The successful management of this collective exploration of uncertainty 
depends upon the construction of boundaries for the collective. As Michel Callon and 
Vololona Rabeharisoa (1998) have argued, this task is intrinsically political, as it 
relates to the ability to stabilise a ‗forum‘ of debate and, through its procedures of 
debate, to determine the collective‘s extension and composition in a form of dynamic 
containment. The composition of the ‗fence‘ that Dr. Belle was referring to is thus 
intimately associated with his suggestion that ‗an institution or group should come to 
some agreement‘. Similar suggestions were reiterated throughout the meeting. 
Together, they lead us to the view that the FDA committee was attempting to 
establish a continuity between this meeting and future meetings as a basis for the 
extended collective they had just reshaped. This was achieved through a careful 
articulation between different types of uncertainty. 
Redistributing Uncertainty 
The collective production of uncertainty about MCI at the FDA meeting and the 
correlated establishment of procedures and actors to manage it was itself a risky 
strategy. Why would the FDA and the collective they supported be invested in a 
‗mystery‘? How could this collective know that the mystery would become less 
mysterious through this strategy? In order to address this practical problem, 
participants in the meeting collectively reflected about key established conventions in 
this field, and in particular the criteria for diagnosis of AD. This entailed looking into 
the ‗black box‘ of the very definition of AD: the association of clinical diagnosis of 
dementia with the neuropathological diagnosis post mortem confirming the presence 
of neuritic plaques and neurofibrillary tangles.  
Dr. Kekoski‘s presentation highlighted this issue as follows:     
In [a neuropathological correlation study], [Dr. Davis] looked at his 
cases that had the postmortem CDR of 0.5 -- now we are moving to the 
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… transition stage that [Dr. Petersen] discussed …. In this particular 
case, when Davis looked at his postmortem CDRs, about 60 percent of 
these cases would have met criteria for Alzheimer's disease at autopsy. 
In our study of the cases, again about 60 percent of these cases also had 
evidence of AD. There is a bit of a paradox here. All of our [MCI] cases 
would get a diagnosis of possible AD under CERAD [neuropath] 
criteria. Again, we are a victim of our definitions. To have a CERAD 
definition of definite AD by autopsy you must have evidence of 
dementia in life. So, we have a logical contradiction here. We cannot 
say these patients had dementia in life; they are the MCI cases. So, if 
they had enough plaques to make a diagnosis by CERAD criteria of 
dementia the highest they can get is a possible AD diagnosis. They 
would have to have had evidence of dementia in life and those path 
changes to get definite AD. (pp. 55-56, our emphasis) 
The consortium to establish a registry for Alzheimer's disease (CERAD) had 
proposed standard neuropathological criteria for the posmortem diagnosis of AD 
(Mirra et al. 1991), which by 2001 was generally accepted and used, particularly in 
the US. However, as Dr. DeKosky makes clear, the neuropathological diagnosis of 
AD depends upon a prior clinical diagnosis of dementia. The clinical diagnosis of 
MCI, or of an equivalent ‗transitional stage‘, introduces a degree of uncertainty to this 
process, in that it is possible for non-demented patients to meet the CERAD neuropath 
criteria for AD. This contradiction makes visible the conventionality of the clinical 
standard for AD diagnosis. In Dr. DeKosky‘s view, the constraining powers of the 
category become more significant than what they facilitate, thus making researchers 
and clinicians ‗victims‘ of their own definitions. 
Questioning the adequacy of the clinical standard for AD diagnosis became a 
recurrent strategy in the participants‘ discussion. Later, in the open discussion section 
of the meeting, Dr. Chui, of the University of Southern California, summarised the 
issue:    
Dr. CHUI: … I think that because MCI is the frontier now we might be 
assuming that the diagnosis of Alzheimer's disease is firm. We have 
dropped the terminology probable Alzheimer's disease, possible 
Alzheimer's disease, and here we are just using Alzheimer's disease. 
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Some of us have acknowledged that we are saying clinical diagnosis of 
Alzheimer's disease. The Alzheimer's disease centers have shown that 
when you look at pathology as the gold standard the clinical diagnosis of 
Alzheimer's disease is fairly sensitive in research settings but it is not 
specific. The sensitivity among 28 centers, collectively contributing over 
2000 cases of dementia, was about 93 percent sensitive but only 55 
percent specific. So, the accuracy was about 85 percent. If you use that 
in evidence-based dementia terms, the likelihood ratio is about 4, which 
isn't considered a very good diagnostic test. (pp. 223-24) 
One particularly interesting aspect of this strategy is how the ‗firmness‘ of the clinical 
standard for the diagnosis of AD is undone by referring to other standards -- the 
CERAD criteria or, in Dr. Chui‘s case, evidence-based medicine criteria for grading 
diagnostic procedures (Sackett et al. 2000). The problematic nature of the AD 
diagnostic standard could then be compared with the problems the FDA committee 
was exploring in relation to MCI diagnostic criteria. This suggested that accepting the 
uncertainties of MCI would require acknowledging the quasi arbitrariness of AD 
(Whitehouse, 2001). That the focus of this comparison was the clinical setting should 
not be surprising because it is in such settings – the Alzheimer‘s centres – that the 
participants had invested hope in finding consistency and validity for MCI. 
Furthermore, this amounted to a challenge to the FDA‘s approved labelling of 
dementia drugs based on clinical trials of patients diagnosed with AD through those 
criteria. Some of the participants in the FDA meeting seemed to be suggesting that if 
the ambiguity of MCI was reason for the FDA to be cautious about extending 
labelling of existing drugs, so should the ambiguity of AD have been a barrier to their 
approval in the first place.      
The solution to this challenge led participants to explore the historicity of their 
conventions. Interestingly, it was left to the representative from the ‗real world‘, Dr. 
Ganguli, to identify the problem:          
[We] are all quite familiar with [the criteria for MCI by now] but … I 
would like to focus your attention on number five for the moment, 
which is what do we mean by not demented? We are, as [Dr. DeKoski] 
said, victims of our own criteria. We are victims of these dementia 
criteria. The NINCDS criteria were published in 1984. They say that 
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you cannot have onset of AD after age 90. Well, this is 2001 and I have 
patients who were perfectly fine until the age of 92. What am I supposed 
to call them? Are we going to be locked in forever into these criteria 
that were written, you know, in good faith 20 years ago? We have 
learned a lot since them. Are we allowed to move the criteria along 
because it is not just where does normal aging cross over into MCI; it is 
also when do we say that they are now demented? (p. 121, our 
emphasis)      
Dr. Ganguli suggested that she was facing a new clinical reality, perhaps 
underpinned by changes in the incidence of cognitive aging in the population between 
1984 and 2001. Moreover, there had been a change in the knowledge base about the 
rates of cognitive aging expected at particular ages. Whereas in 1984, it seemed 
inadequate to categorise an individual as demented if s/he was over 90 years of age, 
because most were likely to have symptoms of dementia, in 2001, there was a clear 
distinction between individuals of that age group who became demented and those 
who did not. She thus offered a new interpretation for why the constraining aspects of 
the conventional standards used in AD appeared to be strengthening: the inadequacies 
of the NINDS criteria (McKhann et al. 1984) were the result of the historical changes 
in the ‗object‘ and the knowledge about AD. It was not a case of a fundamental flaw 
with the criteria: times had changed and so should conventions.  
Recognising the historicity of conventions came to have crucial importance for 
developing the discussion. It brought into focus the temporal aspects of processes of 
adoption of conventions in research and clinical communities. Documenting the 
history of the uptake of AD diagnosis criteria allowed participants to, once more, 
draw equivalences between AD and MCI. The possibility of conducting clinical trials 
on MCI or using MCI in the clinic was a matter of time: 
DR. KAWAS: And, if drugs were to be used for [MIC], how would you 
imagine training the clinicians to do the same thing? 
DR. WAEGEMAN: That is always the difference between the ideal 
situation of a clinical trial and real life, but I think it was already 
mentioned today that ten years ago, twenty years ago there was a 
difficult problem in diagnosing dementia. We think that we have now 
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solved this problem. Maybe in five years time we will be a lot further in 
teaching how to diagnose MCI. (p. 188) 
 
Dr. Kawas‘ interest in the possibility of MCI being used in the clinic is couched in the 
idea that not only does MCI take work to be made visible but also it takes work to 
shape this form of diagnostic criteria This is also contained in Dr Waegemans‘ reply, 
which emphasised the time lag that takes to make conventions usable in the clinic.  
Such an understanding of AD diagnosis was unproblematic for most of the 
participants, who had experienced the process of implementing the NINCDS criteria 
during their professional training or practice. From their perspectives, the adoption 
process was independent from the problems of diagnostic accuracy for AD. It was as 
if participants were suggesting that it was possible to implement consistent diagnostic 
conventions regardless of their accuracy.  
By highlighting the historical character of diagnostic criteria for AD, 
participants at the FDA meeting shifted the burden of responsibility on MCI 
proponents. It was then possible to ask, as did Dr. Duara ‗are we applying an 
unreasonable standard … to MCI when we are [asking] do we have well defined 
standards?‘ (p. 278). One important consequence of this change, in light of what was 
argued in the last section, was that the uncertainty of AD diagnostic criteria became 
part of the wider problem for the collective in which MCI was the key mediating 
entity. Embracing AD diagnosis in the MCI strategy of uncertainty management 
meant also that this collective was not only concerned with differences on a 
synchronous level, but also was committed to re-writing the history of AD. As one of 
us has argued elsewhere, drawing on the case of neurosurgery, the production of 
dis/continuities in the history of collectives is essential for the practical achievement 
of ‗innovation‘ (Moreira, 2000). Similarly, to make MCI possible, AD had to become 
close to being a contingent outcome of history. 
The Strength of Transient Entities 
There were however consequences from investing in this strategy of extended 
uncertainty for MCI itself. If AD diagnostic criteria were a product the past, who 
could say that the same would not happen to MCI in a few years time? Why would 
clinicians need to question something that, despite its inaccuracies, still ‗did its job‘, 
and why shouldn‘t they trust MCI as a category if there was no certainty about its 
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foundations? The remarkable solution that participants devised for this problem 
demonstrates how conventions are integral for action and for generating knowledge 
within bioclinical collectives (Cambrosio et al. 2006). Answering one of the FDA 
panelist‘s question in his presentation, Dr. Ferris argued that, 
MCI broadly speaking is a heterogeneous syndrome. However, 
homogeneous groups representing prodromal AD or other subtypes can, 
I think, reliably be identified. MCI trials can examine disease 
progression or at least clinical progression and provide a bridge in drug 
development between symptomatic trials and the ultimate goal of 
disease prevention trials. (p. 94) 
While, as we know, the FDA committee was not prepared to agree with Dr. 
Ferris‘ version of the diagnostic reliability of MCI criteria, his proposal that MCI 
trials become a ‗bridge between symptomatic trials and the ultimate goal of disease 
prevention trials‘ seemed acceptable. Of course, by accepting this proposal, the FDA 
committee also would be agreeing that MCI is an indication for the drugs tested in 
those trials. This might have been construed as a direct challenge to Dr. Katz‘s 
contention, discussed earlier, that the FDA must adhere to the Federal Food, Drug and 
Cosmetic Act, except for the fact that the committee had first-hand knowledge of the 
convoluted relations between nosological knowledge and therapeutic evaluation. Dr. 
Temple of the FDA used the example of cardiovascular drugs to describe these 
relations: 
I think the history of these kinds of difficulties is that you do the best 
you can, and that sometimes things happen to enable you to distinguish 
things that you formerly felt were the same better than you could before. 
Sorry to use another cardiovascular example, but we now know that 
heart failure comes in two flavours and that the treatments are widely 
different depending on whether your problem is the ventricular beat 
systolic function or filling, diastolic function. And, the drugs that work 
in one don't necessarily work in the other and might even be adverse. 
But for decades people didn't realize this and all of the above got 
included in clinical trials. That probably decreased the effectiveness of 
certain treatments but since we didn't know any better and the net effect 
was beneficial the drugs were approved for undifferentiated heart 
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failure. Now that we are smarter we won't do that anymore. So, the 
situation conceivably, I guess, could be the same here …. It wouldn't be 
the first time, and I am sure some of the people in later Alzheimer's 
disease trials really had something other than Alzheimer's disease. I 
mean, it is hard to imagine that diagnostic accuracy was a hundred 
percent. (pp. 234-35)           
  The interaction between knowledge of diseases and therapeutic research is 
such that clinical trials can only be described as (to paraphrase Dr. Temple) historical 
events. In the contingent situation surrounding the trial ‗you do the best you can‘ in 
the knowledge that the concepts and data supporting the results may be incomplete or 
wrong. Thus, it is necessary to de-emphasise the need for an absolute fit between 
disease and drug, even when drugs are approved. What might seem like a sensible 
policy from the FDA‘s point of view, represents for the proponents of MCI an 
opportunity to employ the category as an entry point into clinical trials. It is 
significant, furthermore, that Dr. Temple, when drawing on the extended uncertainty 
discussed in the last subsection, accepts the precedent that in the AD field trials might 
have been conducted with patients who did not have that disorder. And the situation 
‗could be the same here‘ with MCI.  
In order to understand why the FDA would be willing to support clinical trials 
in an ambiguous situation, such as with MCI, it is necessary to remind ourselves that 
the FDA committee had already established that the question of knowing what MCI 
was, was really a question of defining it as an indication for drugs. In Dr. Temple‘s 
intervention, the clinical trial figures both as a technique to test the effectiveness of 
drugs and as an heuristic tool to explore disease mechanisms. This concurs with Dr. 
Ferris proposition that MCI trials are a bridge between therapeutic ‗paradigms‘. If it 
was possible to conduct an MCI trial, one would be testing not only the drugs in 
question but also the design of the trial, and consequently the adequacy of MCI as an 
entry point, an indication for drugs and as diagnostic entity (Vos, 1991). The 
circularity of the process was predicated upon the ability to transfer the collective 
from one MCI ‗paradigm‘ to another. If MCI were here to stay, it would lose its 
heuristic role..  
It is important to stress that by accepting the heuristic, bridging role of MCI, 
the FDA meeting does more than legitimise an idea that was already in circulation in 
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the field for a few years. By transposing this proposal to the confined collective of 
‗the FDA meeting‘, participants linked this idea to a wider set of policies and 
programmes of action. Endorsing MCI as a ‗means of transportation‘ for the AD 
bioclinical collective was closely aligned with the policies of articulation and 
extension of uncertainty discussed earlier. In effect, it could be argued that in ‗the 
FDA meeting‘, what may have earlier been seen as three different aspects of MCI – 
its epistemic uncertainty, its relation to AD, and its status in trials of old and new 
treatments for dementia – had now become intertwined. The policies that came out of 
‗the FDA meeting‘ summoned basic, clinical and epidemiological researchers, drug 
developers, clinicians, patient associations and regulatory institutions to use MCI as a 
temporary scaffolding device that would align their different purposes and interests. 
As a temporary mediator, MCI would allow them to explore the uncertainties that 
concerned this collective.  
The collective production of uncertainty is embedded in actors‘ reflexive work 
on the historicity of conventional standards. This suggests that participants in ‗the 
FDA meeting‘ were acting as ‗practical historians‘ (Garfinkel in Lynch and Bogen 
1996: 62) and that the collective production of evidence required actors to engage 
with the organisational and political work that assembled documented past and 
present conventions. Unearthing the contingent relations and processes that sustained 
the emergence of past conventions did not, however, lead participants to seek a more 
permanent foundation for the conventions they were creating. The transience of those 
conventions was in fact their main attraction, in that they were built to effect a 
transition between one stage and another, between one set of relations and another.   
 
The influence of the policies endorsed in ‗the FDA meeting‘ -- that MCI could 
be ‗tested‘ in clinical trials -- would only become apparent in later years as research 
results surfaced, clinical trials were finished, and the research and clinical 
communities came to re-assess the epistemic value of MCI. However, what was to 
come was predicted in an interview for Fortune magazine by Harry Tracy, of the 
consultancy company Neuroinvestment, in his assessment that the FDA‘s 
endorsement of MCI opened a ‗totally new landscape for developing memory drugs‘ 
(Stipp, 2001). A measure of the accuracy of this prediction is the growth in the 
number of trials on MCI registered in the FDA sponsored on-line database 
(http://clinicaltrials.gov/): a 13 fold increase from 5 in 2000 to 46 on-going and 
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completed trials in 2007. These include trials of therapies previously licensed for AD, 
as well as new pharmacological compounds, and lifestyle and behavioural 
interventions. This can also be seen from the 76% increase in the number of 
publications on MCI between 2001 and 2002 (see Figure 1). But the most significant 
effect of this meeting in was in how it set methodological standards for therapeutic 
evaluations of drugs for treating MCI (Jelic et al. 2006), which implemented the 
policies set at the meeting for exploring uncertainty.    
A good illustration of this point concerns the announcement of the results of 
one of the first clinical trials using MCI as baseline diagnostic – a trial of Vitamin E 
and a cholinesterase inhibitor (Donepezil) led by Dr. Petersen and sponsored by the 
National Institute of Aging and Pfizer/Esai (Petersen et al, 2005)– which was 
discussed sceptically by expert audiences at international conferences between 2004 
and 2006 (see endnote 1). While there was agreement that the trial had demonstrated 
negative results for primary end points – conversion from MCI to AD – most 
commentators have emphasised its success in designing and conducting a valid MCI 
trail. In an Editorial in the New England Journal of Medicine, where the trial was 
eventually published, for example, Deborah Blacker suggested that:   
[r]ather than wait for new agents, Petersen et al. carefully evaluated the 
ability of two standard treatments for established Alzheimer‘s disease to 
slow the progression from mild cognitive impairment to frank 
Alzheimer‘s disease. … The present trial represents a major step 
forward in the literature on trials of treatment for mild cognitive 
impairment. … What lessons does the study by Petersen et al. offer 
clinicians and their patients with mild cognitive symptoms? First, 
symptoms of memory loss in older persons should be taken seriously, 
since they may represent the beginning of Alzheimer‘s disease, and — 
once more effective early interventions are available — it will be critical 
to ask patients about these symptoms and learn to recognize them as 
early as possible. (Blacker, 2005) 
The clinical significance of MCI derived from its ability to produce 
measurable effects in a clinical trial. In this it might have helped that results were 
clearly – significantly -- negative for Vitamin E and – not so significantly – for 
Donepezil on the conversion of MCI to AD. Nevertheless, the circularity between 
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conventional standards, therapy and therapeutic evaluation (Vos, 1991; Lakoff, 2005: 
173-74), which had been set up in the FDA meeting, resurfaced in a clear message by 
a leading medical journal endorsing the use of MCI in the clinic. 
In addition, only by reference to ‗the FDA meeting‘ is it possible to 
understand that, while or even before such general endorsement took place, the main 
proponent of MCI, Dr. Petersen, could write these words in the leading monograph on 
the topic: 
Ultimately, MCI is likely to be a heuristic concept. It has generated and 
will continue to spawn research on aging and early cognitive 
impairment. At some point the term will be discarded and another will 
take its place. Hopefully, the concept will have contribute to an 
understanding of the spectrum of cognition from normal aging to AD 
(Petersen, 2003: 12) 
Accepting the transience of MCI may have been the price its proponents had to pay 
for bringing it into the ‗real world‘.              
Conclusion 
Social science research on regulatory practices in medicine has examined changes in 
the social organisation of medical work, new forms of medical innovation, evidence-
based medicine, shifts in professional autonomy, and the positioning of users.  
Analytical emphases tend to fall either on exogenous or endogenous drivers of 
regulation. The consolidation of biomedicine in recent decades has put the boundaries 
of medicine in question (Gaudilliere, 2002; Clarke et al. 2003; Keating & Cambrosio, 
2003), and it is argued that regulatory bodies such as the FDA are integral to the 
dynamics of biomedicine (Cambrosio et al. 2006). This paper focused on how 
regulatory bodies fulfil such role by exploring how their ‗knowledge machinery‘ 
frames the collective production of new diagnostic conventions and standards.  
Our close analysis of the FDA meeting on MCI  suggests that the deployment 
of uncertainty is reflexively implicated in bioclinical collectives‘ search for rules and 
conventions, and that the collective production of uncertainty is in fact central to the 
‗knowledge machinery‘ of regulatory objectivity. We have shown that a) the reflexive 
achievement of uncertainty is predicated upon collectives‘ (re)building of socio-
technical boundaries, b) that these boundaries facilitate the re-opening of surrounding 
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epistemic, technical and social black boxes, and c) that it is possible for some 
collectives to reflexively agree on the temporary, historical nature of their 
foundations. We suggest further that the process we have described constitutes a 
general feature of biomedicine‘s epistemic and technological dynamics, in that the 
production and temporary stabilisation of biomedicine‘s knowledge and entities 
requires continuous ‗uncertainty work‘ in the clinic, laboratory and regulatory forum.  
This conclusion is relevant for understanding current changes in research, 
clinical management, and policy on dementia. As we have shown, in the aftermath of 
the FDA meeting, MCI came to embody the promise of new therapeutic 
developments and diagnostic practices for Alzheimer‘s disease. However, it could 
only do so by re-articulating the definition of AD. Some commentators even 
suggested that it has brought about the ‗end‘ of AD (Whitehouse, 2001). There are 
benefits and drawbacks to such re-articulation. One the one hand, MCI contributed to 
an increased recognition of the uncertainty around the causes of AD and fostered 
research within a multifactorial framework in which specific and non-specific 
compounds – for example, statins (Panza et al. 2006) --  co-exist with lifestyle 
interventions for preventing (or delaying) dementia. On the other hand, the research 
and policy focus on MCI and upstream, precursor biomolecular events in the natural 
history of the disease has meant that downstream processes and symptoms are 
receiving less attention (and resources). This has resulted in a growing imbalance 
between the interests and needs of people who already have dementia or are close to 
developing it and those who will possibly benefit from preventative strategies in the 
future as a result of the changes in the field of dementia research.  
Finally, the paper leads to the suggestion that in the exploration of 
uncertainties around and underpinning bioclinical conventions, actors and institutions 
could do worse than seek the assistance and collaboration of STS academics. Our 
attention to uncertainty, contingency and multiplicity could, in this particular setting, 
help not only in unearthing the links that tie present conventions together but also in 
building new, required supports for knowledge making and clinical work. This 
however  might prove more challenging than the examination Cole endured in his 
admissibility hearing (Lynch and Cole, 2008) in that instead of positionings along 
dichotomies of belief and credibility, institutions might require ‗proof‘ of enduring 
political commitment to the collective (see ‗Putting a fence around a 
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mystery‘).Accepting the stability of our alliances may be the price we have to pay for 
being able to explore the uncertainties of biomedicine from within. 
                                                 
Notes 
 
i
 The study was undertaken between 2004 and 2006. Data were collected through: a) historical 
literature review on MCI and cognate concepts; b) participant observation of scientific conferences in 
the dementia field,  c) semi-structured interviews with experts in dementia research, care and policy; d) 
observation of fieldwork in a dementia clinic and in neuropathology laboratory; e) symposia and 
research-user workshops . A systematic search strategy was used to identify relevant literature through 
MedLine (1350 refs). Conventional methods of historical research were used to identify key research 
papers. We developed ethnographic fieldwork at seven international biomedical conferences, which 
entailed qualitative, participant observation of communication in the relevant fields. We also conducted 
37 interviews with international experts in dementia research, care and policy. These were qualitative 
semi-structured interviews on the scientific, clinical and societal meanings of MCI and/or early 
diagnosis and prevention of dementia. We used a stratified purposive sampling strategy, according to 
field of expertise, country and gender, having as main selection criteria the publication of relevant 
scientific, clinical or policy research on MCI identified through the literature review. In symposia and a 
research user workshop, potential users of the results of the project -- researchers, clinicians, carers and 
patients -- were invited to discuss the outcomes of the project and to consider how this research might 
move forward to influence and benefit older people with memory problems. See Moreira & Bond 
(2008), and  Moreira, et al. (2008).  
iiThe concept of ‗bioclinical collective‘ aims to capture the extended, heterogeneous, distributed 
character of the production of evidence that is required by the contemporary intersections between 
laboratory and the clinic. As the name suggests, such collectives are characterised by a concern around 
an hybrid entity or category that is neither wholly derived from clinical observation nor from laboratory 
experimentation (Keating and Cambrosio, 2003).  The conceptual genealogy of the concept can be 
traced back to Callon and Law‘s (1995) notion of hybrid collective as an alternative to social network 
or ‗society‘ because as Latour concisely explains, ‗Unlike society, which is an artefact imposed by the 
modernist settlement, this terms refers to the association of humans and non-humans. While the 
division between nature and society renders invisible the political process by which the cosmos is 
collected in one livable whole, the word collective makes this process central. Its slogan could be ‗no 
reality without representation‘‖ (Latour, 1999: 304). This concept was further developed by Callon and 
Rabeharisoa (1998) in their notion of the patient collective  as an unfolding compositions of 
bodies, competences, representations artefacts, procedures and emotions gathered together 
by particular activities around a  particular condition/illness. As with these concepts, the notion of 
bioclinical collective aims to emphasise the way in which links between heterogeneous entities are 
deployed in the representation –the convention in this case- that bring them into being.  For this reason, 
who and what belongs to a particular collective and in what capacity is mostly an empirical that is 
related to the activity at hand.     
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iii
 We thank Andrew Webster for having suggested this analytical proposition. 
iv
 Although not explicitly, our analysis of the emergence of MCI draws as background previous work 
on the dynamics of classificatory systems and diagnostic categories. Of particular significance is 
Bowker and Star‘s (1999) work on how categories, when left alone, become embedded in practice, 
invisible as organising, political devices for those who use them. As Bowker and Start remark most 
professionals recognise the constructed, conventional nature of the categories and classificatory 
systems they use although these issue tend not to be explored collectively (Bowker and Star, 1999: 
320). Our study exactly focuses on situations where it is necessary to conduct such exploration.    
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